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The paper presents a model where public pensions are determined by majority
voting. Voters di®er by age and income. Moreover, life expectancy increases with
income. Depending on the strength of the link between contributions and bene¯ts,
and the relationship between income and life expectancy, individually optimal tax
rates may increase or decrease with income. If they decrease, high tax rates are
supported by pensioners and poor workers. If they increase with income, the coalition
for high tax rates consists of pensioners and rich workers. `Ends against the middle'
equilibria are also possible.
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11 Introduction
Social spending has grown rapidly in industrial democracies, and a large part of this in-
crease has been in old age pension systems.1 Understanding the reasons for this increase is
therefore of great importance. Demographics are an obvious candidate for an explanation.
Decreasing fertility and increasing life expectancy have led to an increasing political weight
of pensioners.
The role played by intergenerational redistribution lies at the heart of many of the
early contributions to the political economy of pensions (for a survey, see Galasso and
Profeta, 2002). Following Browning (1975), much of the literature assumed that pensions
are the outcome of a voting game where individuals di®er by age only (e.g., Boadway and
Wildasin, 1989). A natural implication is that pensions are determined by the voter with
the median age. Browning (1975) argued that the social security budget is too large in a
democracy, since the old and middle aged favor higher pensions than the young, but only
the young internalize all the bene¯ts and costs of pensions.2
However, as pension bene¯ts are usually not perfectly tied down by contributions,
pension systems redistribute within as well as between generations. Tabellini (2000) and
Persson and Tabellini (2000) study models which allow for redistribution between voters
who di®er by income. Persson and Tabellini (2000) show that if bene¯ts are unrelated to
contributions, a coalition of old and poor young voters favoring high pensions is opposed
by a coalition of rich young voters who favor low or zero pensions. With three generations,
there are two decisive voters, a young and a middle aged one, where the young decisive
1This paper is exclusively concerned with unfunded or pay-as-you-go pension systems.
2A related argument is brought fourth by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) who study a lobbying
model of pension provision. Since the old do not work, their opportunity cost of lobbying is lower than
that of workers, which may explain why the old are politically more powerful than mere numbers would
suggest.
2voter has lower income than the middle aged one. See also Tabellini (2000) and Razin,
Sadka and Swagel (2002) for similar models. Since the individually optimal tax rate of the
decisive voters decreases with their income and increases with average income, the models
predict that more inequality (appropriately measured) should lead to higher pensions. Yet
the empirical support for this hypothesis is mixed (Lindert, 1996; Perotti, 1996; Tabellini,
2000; Razin et al., 2002). Therefore, new theoretical models which reexamine the link
between income inequality and pension levels seem to be warranted.
Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Tabellini (2000) assume a Beveridgean pension sys-
tem, where the individual bene¯ts are not related to individual contributions. Yet many
countries have pension systems where bene¯ts do depend on contributions. Casamatta,
Cr¶ emer and Pestieau (2000b) study a system which can be a combination of Beveridgean
and Bismarckian, where in the latter bene¯ts are determined by one's own contributions.3
They show that when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low, the individually
optimal pension level increases with income until some level ^ w, above which the optimal
pension is zero. The decisive voter has income ~ w < ^ w, and all individuals with ~ w < w < ^ w
prefer higher pensions and all those with w < ~ w or w > ^ w lower pensions.
This paper analyzes another dimension of individual heterogeneity which in°uences
the distributional con°ict over pensions, namely, di®ering life expectancies. Since the
individual pension is paid out as an annuity regardless of one's life span, the pension
system redistributes from individuals with short life expectancy to those who live longer.
For instance, for a given earnings history typical pension systems redistribute from men
to women, since women live longer on average. Furthermore, since wealthier individuals
tend to live longer, the intragenerational redistribution implied by public pension systems
is reduced. Interestingly, while the importance of ageing for social security is recognized
3Casamatta, Cr¶ emer and Pestieau (2000a) study the same model where the strength of the Bismarckian
factor is chosen at the constitutional stage.
3both in discussions of policy reform and in political economy models (e.g., Casamatta
et al., 2000b; Razin et al., 2002), the fact that life expectancy varies has not yet been
addressed in positive political models.4
I use a model similar to Casamatta et al. (2000b). Voters di®er with respect to age and
income, but in addition I assume that wealthier individuals live longer. This assumption
is supported by numerous empirical studies. For instance, Deaton and Paxson (1999) ¯nd
a strong positive e®ect of wealth on life expectancy in the US, and similar ¯ndings are
obtained by Attanasio and Emerson (2001) for the UK and Reil-Held (2000) for Germany.
The implication is that the pension system will be less regressive than it looks on paper.
Some authors have indeed found that the positive e®ect of income on life expectancy can
make a pension system regressive. See Coronado, Fullerton and Glass (2000) for the US,
Gil and Lopez-Casasnovas (1997) for Spain, and Reil-Held (2000) for Germany.
I study the implication of this assumption for voting outcomes when pension systems
can be either Bismarckian or Beveridgean or a combination of the two. Pensions are ¯-
nanced by payroll taxes on labor income. Depending on how much life expectancy increases
with income and how tight the link between contributions and bene¯ts is, workers' opti-
mal tax rates may increase or decrease with income. The di®erent voting equilibria which
result are characterized. If the optimal tax rate decreases with income, the coalition for
high taxes consists of pensioners and poor workers as in Persson and Tabellini (2000). If
the individually optimal tax rate increases with income, the coalition for high tax rates
instead consists of pensioners and rich workers. It is also possible that the relationship
between optimal tax rates and income is U-shaped, in which case an `ends against the
middle' outcome obtains, as in some models of private provision of public goods (Epple
and Romano, 1996).
A model similar to the present one is presented by Bethencourt Marrero and Galasso
4An exception is Bethencourt Marrero and Galasso (2001); see below.
4(2001). They argue that social security and public health care are complementary: public
health care decreases the longevity di®erential between rich and poor individuals, which
increases the demand for public pensions of the poor. However, in their model, the pension
system is assumed to be progressive. By contrast, in my model, public pensions can be
either progressive or regressive, depending on the link between bene¯ts and contributions,
and the e®ect of income on longevity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model economy. Section 3
analyzes the voting equilibrium. The last section concludes the paper.
2 The model
Suppose at each point in time there are two generations alive, the young (workers) and
the old (pensioners). The old population is normalized to one; furthermore, I assume
population grows at constant rate n > 0.5 Pensioners have no income except for savings and
pension bene¯ts. Within the young generation, individuals di®er by their income, denoted
y, and life expectancy. Income is distributed according to the distribution function F(y)
with the associated density f(y). Median income is ym, where F(ym) = 1
2, and average
income ¹ y =
R
ydF(y). If the distribution is skewed to the right, average income exceeds
median income: F(¹ y) > 1=2.
Denote individuals' working lives as period 0, and retirement as period 1. While every-
one reaches retirement, a worker with income y lives for the fraction °(y) of her retirement.
The function °(y) is positively increasing, so life expectancy increases with income. This
may be thought of as a shortcut to express a more general relationship, where life ex-
5Of course, population might well shrink in the model as it does in reality in many countries. However,
this would put the pensioners in the majority which would make the model uninteresting. This assumption
could be relaxed if there were more than two generations.
5pectancy is a function of health spending, and richer individuals spend more on health and
therefore live longer.
Birth rates are assumed to be identical for all workers so the young population is just
an n times larger replica of the old one, and the income distribution remains constant over
time.
I assume that the structure of the economy is common knowledge. In particular, voters
know the income distribution and the °(y) function, so they know their own as well as ev-
eryone else's life expectancy. Note, however, that °(y) can be interpreted as the probability
of reaching retirement, in which case uncertainty comes into play.
Preferences of a worker with income y are given by




where ci refers to consumption in period i. ± is the common discount rate, which is
assumed to equal the given world interest rate r. I will assume dynamic e±ciency so
r > n. Utility is increasing and concave in c0 : u0 > 0 > u00. The assumption of quasilinear
preferences is made for simplicity.6 It implies that all income e®ects are absorbed by old
age consumption. While this assumption is not innocuous, all results could be generated
with a more general additive utility function under suitable restrictions on risk aversion
(see Proposition 3 below).
Pensioners' preferences are similar to workers', but their savings decision is bygone.
Thus, preferences of a pensioner with income y are given by
Up = c1:
I assume full commitment, that is, once voted on, both taxes and the pension level
6Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Tabellini (2000) also make this assumption.








where ¿ is the °at payroll tax rate and P the constant pension received during retirement.
Consumers maximize utility by choice of c0 and c1. Letting Á(c) denote the inverse func-
tion of u0(c), optimal working life consumption is c¤
0 = Á(1), with all income e®ects absorbed
by old age consumption.8 For future reference, de¯ne the function v(1) ´ u(Á(1)) ¡ Á(1).
3 Voting
The pension level is given by
P = ¯(®y + (1 ¡ ®)¹ y); (3)
where ¯ is set to balance the government budget (see below). Note that an individual with
income y will receive this pension only for the fraction °(y) of the retirement period. As
in Casamatta et al. (2000b), the pension system is assumed to be a convex combination
of Beveridgean and Bismarckian. For ® = 0, the pension level depends on average income
only and is not related to the individual contribution so it is purely Beveridgean. For ® = 1
pension bene¯ts depend on own contributions only so we have a pure Bismarckian system.
Most real world pension systems, however, correspond to neither of the two pure systems
but rather to a combination of the two.9 The Bismarckian factor is taken to be ¯xed in
7Without commitment, young individuals should oppose pensions if they expect the contributions they
pay to be lost. Tabellini (2000) has a model without commitment, where the pension level chosen is still
positive because of altruism between parents and children. See Galasso and Profeta (2002) for a survey of
the issue of commitment.
8More precisely, letting Y be an individual's present value of lifetime income, optimal ¯rst period
consumption is maxf0;minfY;Á(1)gg.
9For instance, Germany's pension system is Bismarckian in the sense that bene¯ts are determined by
the level of one's own contributions. However, there are some elements which make the system impure, for
7the constitution.10 If one were to neglect di®ering life expectancies, the system would be
progressive for ® < 1.
In order to characterize interior equilibrium tax rates in a simple way, I assume that
tax revenue is given by
T =
¡
¿ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)¿
2¢
¹ y:
The term (1 ¡ ®)¿2 is introduced to capture the distortionary e®ect of payroll taxes.
There is a La®er curve with the revenue maximizing tax rate at ¹ ¿ = minf1;1=(2(1¡®))g.
Workers do recognize that part of taxation is contributory, so distortions arise only from
the non-contributory part of payroll taxes.11
The government budget constraint is
(1 + n)
¡
¿ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)¿
2¢
¹ y = ¯
Z
(®y + (1 ¡ ®)¹ y)°(y)dF(y): (4)
What will be the pension level chosen by majority voting? Note ¯rst that all pen-
sioners prefer the contribution rate which maximizes pensions, ¹ ¿, irrespective of their life
expectancy, since they do not contribute anymore to the pension system.
For workers, there is a tradeo®, since high contributions lower net income from working
while leading to higher future pensions. Using (2), (3), and (4) in (1), a worker's indirect
instance, the recognition of education or child rearing in the bene¯t formula, even though no contributions
were paid for those years.
10Casamatta et al. (2000a) derive the choice of ® at the constitutional stage. See also Conde-Ruiz and
Profeta (2002) who study simultaneous voting on ¿ and ® and resort to the concept of structure induced
equilibrium to resolve the cycling issue in multidimensional voting.
11This formulation follows Casamatta et al. (2000b). It would be possible to derive the tax distortion
endogenously by adding a labor supply model. Note, however, that even when the system is purely
Bismarckian, there is a tax distortion if the economy is dynamically e±cient (assuming identical life
expectancies), but this distortion is smaller than for ® < 1. For simplicity, I use the formulation in the
text.
8utility function can be written





¿ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)¿
2¢














and ¹ ° =
R
°(y)dF(y) is average life expectancy.
Since utility is concave in ¿, workers' preferences over the contribution rate are single
peaked. Therefore, the median voter theorem applies: there exists a unique Condorcet
winner which corresponds to the median of the optimal tax rates. It remains to be shown
whose optimal tax rate this is { in other words, who the median voter is.
Maximizing (5) with respect to ¿ gives voters' optimal tax rates:
Proposition 1 A worker's optimal tax rate is given by:
¿(y;¢) = minf1;maxf0; ^ ¿gg (6)






(1 + n)°(y)(®y + (1 ¡ ®)¹ y)
¶
: (7)
Whether this tax rate is positive or zero depends on the worker's income, and life
expectancy relative to the average of other voters, as well as on the redistributive nature
of the pension system.
Consider a pure Beveridgean system. From (7), with ® = 0, a worker's optimal tax









Suppose that r = n. Then a worker can bene¯t from public pensions in two ways: either
if she has lower than average income, or if she has higher than average life expectancy.
9Whether a worker who is richer than average prefers zero pensions depends on the income
distribution and the shape of the life expectancy function.
Note that for ® = 1, ^ ¿ is not de¯ned. Because the tax distortion vanishes with a pure
Bismarckian system and utility is linear in old age consumption, the optimal tax rate will
be either zero or one, depending on whether the discounted sum of bene¯ts is smaller or
larger than the contribution.
Hence, under a pure Bismarckian system, ® = 1, a worker's optimal tax rate is
¿(y;¢) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if (1 + n)°(y) < (1 + r)
^ y
¹ y
¿ 2 [0;1] if (1 + n)°(y) = (1 + r)
^ y
¹ y




where ^ y ´
R
y°(y)dF(y) is life expectancy weighted average income.
Under the Bismarckian system, if r = n, for identical life expectancies each individual
would receive a pension which just equals her contributions. With di®ering life expectan-
cies, whether a worker bene¯ts from the pension system depends on her life expectancy
and the relation of life expectancy weighted average income to average income.







The following result characterizes how the optimal tax rate changes with income.12
Proposition 2 A worker's optimal tax rate satis¯es:
@¿(y;¢)
@y
T 0 , ² T
(1 ¡ ®)¹ y
®y + (1 ¡ ®)¹ y
: (8)




(1 + r)¡[y°0(y)(®y + (1 ¡ ®)¹ y) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)¹ y°(y)]
2(1 ¡ ®)(1 + n)[(®y + (1 ¡ ®)¹ y)°(y)]2 :
12Strictly speaking, of course, the result only holds for individuals with an interior optimal tax rate.
10Solving the inequality on the left of (8) for °0(y) and using the de¯nition of ² gives the
result. ¥
If ² = 0, the optimal tax rate is nonincreasing in income; it is strictly decreasing for
® < 1. If life expectancy were the same for all individuals, the pension system would be
progressive unless it is purely Bismarckian. However, since life expectancy increases with
income, the system might be regressive even if it is less than fully Bismarckian.
The rightmost expression in (8) is decreasing in ® and increasing in ¹ y. Thus, the
optimal tax rate is more likely to increase with income, the more Bismarckian the pension
system, and the lower average income. Assuming ² to be constant, it is also more likely
the higher a voter's income (unless the system is purely Beveridgean) , and the larger the
income elasticity of life expectancy.
Using the extreme cases of ® = 0 and ® = 1 in (8) gives the two polar cases:
Corollary 1 Under a pure Bismarckian system, the individually optimal tax rate increases
with income if and only if ² > 0, which holds by assumption. Under a pure Beveridgean
system, the individually optimal tax rate increases with income if and only if ² > 1.
The Bismarckian system is proportional if life expectancy is identical for all income
earners, and regressive if longevity increases with income. By contrast, the Beveridgean
system is regressive only if the income elasticity of longevity is larger than one.
Before proceeding, a note on the generality of the results may be in order. Suppose
utility is of the form U = u(c0)+u(c1)=(1+±). Casamatta et al. (2000b) show in a model
with homogeneous life expectancy that optimal tax rates increase with income if ½ < 1,
where ½ is the (constant) coe±cient of relative risk aversion (which equals the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution). In the present model, the following result holds.
11Proposition 3 Let U = u(c0) +
u(c1)
1+± and T = ¿¹ y. With a Bismarckian system, optimal
tax rates increase with income if ² > 0. In a Beveridgean system, the optimal tax rate
increases with income if ² > ½ ¡ 1.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Hence, the results stated below can be generated with a general additive utility func-
tion under suitable assumptions on risk aversion. The next result characterizes possible
properties of the voting equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (i) If the optimal tax rate of workers is decreasing in income, the equilib-
rium tax rate, ¿¤, is that of the worker with income yl, where F(yl) = n
2(1+n) < 1
2. (ii) If
the optimal tax rate is increasing in income, the decisive voter has income yh > yl, where
F(yh) = 2+n
2(1+n) > 1
2. (iii) If the relationship between optimal tax rates and income is U-
shaped, there is a pair of decisive voters with incomes y1 < y2, where F(y2)¡F(y1) = 2+n
2(1+n).
Proof. In case (i), the coalition favoring high tax rates consists of pensioners and workers
with income y < yl. This must be half the population in equilibrium. Since pensioners
have mass one, workers with income below y have mass (1 + n)F(y), and the total pop-
ulation has mass 2 + n, this implies that 1 + (1 + n)F(yl) = 1
2(2 + n). In case (ii), those
favoring low taxes are workers with y < yh, which again must be half the population,
(1+n)F(yh) = 1
2(2+n). In case (iii), the coalition preferring low taxes consists of workers
with incomes y1 < y < y2, where (1 + n)(F(y2) ¡ F(y1)) = 1
2(2 + n). ¥
The proposition shows that several outcomes are possible. Case (i) is the same as in
Persson and Tabellini (2000). Redistribution is from young to old and rich to poor. Since
all the old prefer maximum pensions, the decisive voter is a young voter with income below







Figure 1: Optimal tax rates in case (iii).
the coalition of high tax rate supporters consists of pensioners and rich workers, with the
decisive voter's income above the median. In this case, intragenerational redistribution is
from poor to rich, as demonstrated empirically, for instance, by Coronado et al. (2000). In
case (iii) the relationship between income and optimal tax rate is non-monotonic. There
are two decisive voters. One has income above and one below the median (see Figure 1).13
In this case, intragenerational redistribution is from the middle class to the poor (who
pay low taxes) and rich (who outlive the middle class su±ciently to bene¯t from social
security).
4 Conclusion
Public pension systems redistribute across and, possibly within generations. The latter
type of redistribution comes about because individual pension bene¯ts are not perfectly
13In the case of dynamic e±ciency, there must be some individuals who prefer a zero tax rate, whereas in a
dynamically ine±cient economy, all young individuals may bene¯t from the pension system (Aaron, 1966).
13tied down by contributions. Since lower income individuals usually contribute less for a
similar pension than high income individuals, pension systems may be progressive. How-
ever, high income individuals also live longer. Hence, the system may even be regressive if
the longer life expectancy more than outweighs the higher contributions. There is growing
empirical evidence that real world pension systems may actually be regressive when indi-
vidual heterogeneity of life expectancy is taken into account (e.g., Coronado et al., 2000; Gil
and Lopez-Casasnovas, 1997; Reil-Held, 2000). It is interesting to note that this result can
be found in more Bismarckian systems such as Germany, but also in more Beveridgean
systems such as the US.
The paper shows that this may have important implications for voting outcomes. If
life expectancy were identical for all individuals and the pension system Beveridgean, the
coalition for high pensions would consist of pensioners and poor workers. If the system
is su±ciently Bismarckian and life expectancy su±ciently income elastic, this coalition
may instead consist of pensioners and the rich workers. Other possible outcomes have an
`ends against the middle' property as in the public provision of private goods (Epple and
Romano, 1996). In particular, there may be equilibria where within the young generation
the pensions system redistributes from the middle class to the rich and poor. This is, in a
sense, `Director's law' stood on its head.
The model also has implications for the empirical study of pension systems. If pensions
were to redistribute from rich to poor, one would expect more income inequality (appro-
priately measured) to lead to higher pension levels. The evidence on this is, however,
mixed (see Lindert, 1996; Perotti, 1996; Tabellini, 2000; Razin et al., 2002). The model
presented here might partially account for this. In fact, if the pension system is su±ciently
Bismarckian and life expectancy increases with income, more inequality may lead to lower
pensions. One possible interpretation of this mixed evidence is data problems or omitted
variables. Another is that in cross country studies, in some countries the pension level may
14be positively and in others negatively in°uenced by inequality, depending on the strength
of the Bismarckian factor and the relationship between life expectancy and income. Future
empirical research may tackle these questions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3




s.t. c0 = (1 ¡ ¿)y ¡ s
c1 = (1 + r)s +
°(y)
¡
(1 + n)(®y + (1 ¡ ®)¹ y):





1 5 0; (9)
where u0
i ´ u0(ci) for i = 0;1. The ¯rst order condition for an interior solution for the








(®y + (1 ¡ ®)¹ y)u
0
2 = 0: (10)
From (9) and (10), an individual who votes for a positive tax rate will not save privately.
Di®erentiating (10) with respect to y gives
Áy = ¡yu
0



















De¯ne ½i = ½ ´ ¡ciu00
i=u0
i, where c0 = (1¡¿)y and c1 =
°(y)
¡ (1+n)¿(®y +(1¡®)¹ y) for an















15Substituting ® = 0 or ® = 1 into (11) and simplifying gives the result. ¥
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